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We estimate the effect of shifts in monetary policy using the term structure of interest rates. In our
no-arbitrage model, the short rate follows a version of the Taylor (1993) rule where the coefficients
on the output gap and inflation vary over time. The monetary policy loading on the output gap has
averaged around 0.4 and has not changed very much over time. The overall response of the yield curve
to output gap components is relatively small. In contrast, the inflation loading has changed substantially
over the last 50 years and ranges from close to zero in 2003 to a high of 2.4 in 1983. Long-term bonds
are sensitive to inflation policy shifts with increases in inflation loadings leading to higher short rates
and widening yield spreads.
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Over the last ﬁfty years there have been dramatic changes in the intellectual foundation guiding
monetary policy. The understanding of the nature of the trade-off between inﬂation on the one
hand, and unemployment and real activity on the other, played a central role in this evolution.
According to typical textbook accounts of this evolution, monetary policy in the 1960s was
believed to have a lasting inﬂuence on unemployment and real activity, which could be achieved
by trading off higher inﬂation with lower unemployment. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the
work of Friedman and Phelps leading to the natural-rate hypothesis, the new understanding
of the role of expectations, and the bruising macroeconomic experience of high inﬂation, all
led to a fundamental shift in the paradigm. Since then, monetary policy’s ability to inﬂuence
unemployment and real activity is believed to be short lived, and has only a lasting effect on
inﬂation.
Given this evolution of the understanding of the economic environment, it is difﬁcult to
believe that the conduct of monetary policy – the way policy authorities respond to the state of
the economy – did not change in substantial ways. Sargent (1999) explains the rise of inﬂation
in the 1970s and its subsequent fall in the 1980s on the basis of evolving beliefs about the
trade-off between inﬂation and real activity. The Volcker disinﬂation in the early 1980s is
an important and well-known example of the inﬂuence of the shifting paradigm on the actual
conduct of monetary policy. The increased independence of central banks and the adoption of
inﬂation targeting by many countries since the early 1990s are other clear manifestations of
how the evolution of monetary policy theory has inﬂuenced monetary authorities.1 Such shifts
would have translated into time-varying responses of the Fed to inﬂation and real activity.
Not surprisingly, there has been a voluminous empirical literature attempting to document
and quantify the importance of the changes in monetary policy.2 One question that has received
little attention so far is the implications of the shifting response of monetary policy to inﬂation
and real activity on the term structure of interest rates. A growing number of studies that have
employed macro factors in term structure models have found that macroeconomic ﬂuctuations
1 The implied evolution of monetary policy is complex and is not necessarily conﬁned to a unidirectional evo-
lution from worse to better. Romer and Romer (2002) discuss how the evolution of economic theory maps into
changes in the way stabilization policies have been conducted. They argue that monetary policy in the 1980s is
much more similar to monetary policy during the 1950s and 1960s than monetary policy during the 1970s.
2 See, among many others, Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000), Orphanides (2001), Cogley and Sargent (2001,
2005), Sims and Zha (2006), and Boivin (2006).
1are an important source of uncertainty affecting bond risk premia.3 Shifts in monetary policy
could produce similar effects and be priced risk factors. In fact, monetary policy changes should
affect the entire term structure because the actions of the Fed at the short end of the yield curve
inﬂuence the dynamics of the long end of the yield curve through no-arbitrage restrictions.4
However, it is not clear how changing monetary policy affects long-term yields. Suppose
the post-Volcker period can indeed be characterized as a much stronger desire to control inﬂa-
tion. On the one hand, for a given expected inﬂation rate, the higher sensitivity of short term
interest rate to inﬂation might build up into higher long-term interest rates. On the other hand,
the stronger stance on inﬂation, if credible, might lead to lower and less variable expected in-
ﬂation, and thus, lower risk premia. Another interesting episode is the recent ﬂattening yield
curve between 2002 and 2005: an open question question is how much of this behavior is due
to changes in monetary policy stances as opposed to other macro forces, such as the risk of
deﬂation and low economic growth.
One central goal of this paper is to investigate the implications of the changes in the conduct
of monetary policy on the shape and dynamics of the term structure of interest rates. To the ex-
tent that monetary policy has implications for the whole term structure, this also means that the
entire yield curve, not just the short rate, contains potentially valuable information about mon-
etary policy shifts. Exploiting additional information to identify policy shifts is useful because
the literature has not come to a consensus in characterizing the nature of monetary policy shifts
and their quantitative importance. On one side, Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000) and Cogley
and Sargent (2003, 2005) conclude that there have been important changes in the conduct of
monetary policy that overall line up with a shift pre- and post-Volcker. On the opposite side of
the debate, Orphanides (2001, 2003) and Sims and Zha (2005) ﬁnd that either the conduct of
monetary policy has not changed, or that if it did, the changes are not quantitatively important.
3 A now large literature incorporating Taylor (1993) policy rules into term structure models following Ang and
Piazzesi (2003) documents that the yield curve prices inﬂation and economic growth risk. Recently, Duffee (2006)
disputes how much macro risk matters in bond prices, but most recent work including Buraschi and Jiltsov (2007),
Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2008), Rudebusch and Wu (2008), and Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton (2009) ﬁnd that
inﬂation or economic growth, or both, play important roles in determining bond risk premia. Other studies that use
other measures of macro factors like Pennachi (1991), who uses inﬂation surveys, and Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005),
who use monetary aggregates, also ﬁnd macro factors are priced.
4 Two papers allowing for discrete regime shifts in monetary policy affecting the yield curve are Fuhrer (1996)
and Bikbov (2006). As we explain below, our monetary policy shifts can approximate discrete regime shifts but
better account for more a gradual evolution of monetary policy. Neither Fuhrer (1996) nor Bikbov (2006) estimate
the price of risk of monetary policy changes.
2Following this literature, we estimate monetary policy shifts by estimating changes in the pa-
rameters of a reaction function, where the Fed implements monetary policy through the setting
of a short-term interest rate. Our study is the ﬁrst to use a no-arbitrage model to identify policy
shifts, which carry their own prices of risk, that allows information from the whole yield curve
to be used.
We estimate a quadratic term structure model, where the dynamics of the short rate follow a
version of Taylor’s (1993) policy rule. Our no-arbitrage model allows for the Fed responses to
inﬂation and output to potentially vary over time. Their evolution is assumed to obey a VAR that
includes inﬂation and real activity. This allows changes in the policy parameters to be arbitrarily
persistent and entertains the possibility that their current value may be inﬂuenced by the past
behavior of the economy. For instance, an aggressive inﬂation response today might be due to
inﬂation being high in the past. This is in contrast to most existing studies which assume that
the time variation in the policy parameters is exogenous. Most importantly, modeling the policy
shifts as stationary processes allows us to let agents form expectations with the knowledge that
monetary policy is shifting. That is, agents are not oblivious to the fact that monetary policy
changes over time and take into account future changes in forming prices. Since one objective
is estimating the price of risk of policy shifts, this modeling approach is particularly desirable.5
We perform a series of exercises with the estimated model. We document the importance of
the historical changes in monetary policy and discuss these changes in the context of evolving
economic views. We investigate the effect of these policy changes on the term structure of
interest rates by computing impulse responses and expected holding period returns. Finally, we
directly estimate the price of risk of monetary policy shifts.
Our key ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, our estimates suggest that monetary
policychangedsubstantiallyoverthelast50years. Inparticular, theFed’ssensitivitytoinﬂation
has changed markedly over time and our estimates are consistent with the broad contours of
shifts in the intellectual framework behind monetary policy practice. In this respect, these
estimates are largely consistent with the evidence reported in Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000),
and Cogley and Sargent (2005). One important feature of our results is that the evolution of
monetary policy cannot be simply summarized by a once and for all shift of monetary policy
under Volcker. For instance, we ﬁnd that the response to inﬂation under Greenspan has been
subject to large ﬂuctuations and that in the early 1990s and in 2003-2004, it was as low or lower
5 Note this modeling approach is in the spirit of Christopher Sims’ perspective on policy intervention in a
rational expectations context. See Sargent (1984) and Sims (1987).
3than in the 1970s. The use of term structure information in the estimation of the policy rule
leads to sharp parameter estimates, which statistically allow us to reject the hypothesis that the
nominal short rate increased by more than inﬂation – the so-called Taylor principle – throughout
the 1970s.
Second, we ﬁnd shifts of monetary policy stances with regards to the output gap exhibit
small variation. Our model estimates imply that most of the discretion in monetary policy has
resulted from changing the response of the Fed to inﬂation rather than to output. The ﬁnding of
very small variation in the output loadings is the opposite conclusion to estimates from models
using random walks to capture the time variation of monetary policy coefﬁcients. In these
models estimated without yield curve information the policy loadings on output shocks exhibit
much larger time variation.
Third, changes in monetary policy have a quantitatively important inﬂuence on the shape
of the term structure. A surprise increase in the Fed response to inﬂation ﬂuctuations, ceteris
paribus, raises short term rates and increases the term spread. This suggests that investors
perceive a higher response to inﬂation at the short-end of the yield curve as giving bonds of
all maturities greater exposure to inﬂation and other macro risk. A stronger inﬂation policy
response does not reduce inﬂation and other risk premia. Surprise increases in the inﬂation
response induce a relatively large increase in yield spreads. In contrast, the effect of a surprise
increase in the output gap stance increases the short rate and shrinks the term spread, which is
also qualitatively similar to the effect of positive surprise to inﬂation or real activity. However,
output gap components account for a relatively small proportion of yield movements.
We ﬁnd that recently the stance of the Fed to inﬂation has decreased dramatically during the
post-2001 period. The Fed response to inﬂation decreased to below one in 2001 and reached a
low close to zero in 2003. This is consistent with an aggressive response of the Fed to a deﬂation
threat during that period.6 This would imply that the relationship between the Fed’s forecast
for inﬂation and current and past values of inﬂation and real activity changed over this period.
Another interpretation is that short-term interest rates were held too low for too long a period
of time in the face of deﬂationary threats from the aftermath of the 2001 recession and the
September 2001 terrorist attacks.7 Short rates reached 0.90% in 2003:Q2. If the Fed had held
6 The Fed was concerned about the possibility of deﬂation at the time. Since contemporaneous inﬂation re-
mained positive and we estimate the policy response to contemporaneous inﬂation, an aggressive reduction in the
policy rate justiﬁed by expected deﬂation would be estimated in our framework as a weaker response to current
inﬂation.
7 This is a popular view taken by some media commentators including John B. Taylor in “How Government
4its responses on the output gap and inﬂation constant at their values during 2000, the short rate
during this period would have been 2.74%. Thus, according to this counter-factual experiment,
interest rates would have been substantially higher if the Fed had not eased its stance to inﬂation
as much as it did during the early 2000s.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the modeling framework.
It ﬁrst describes the short rate equation, speciﬁed as a time-varying policy reaction function, and
then derives bond prices based on a quadratic, arbitrage-free, term structure model. Section 3
describes the data. In Section 4 we discuss the parameter estimates, describe the estimated time
series of the policy coefﬁcients, show how policy changes affect the yield curve, and quantify
how policy shift risk is priced. Section 5 concludes. The details of the bond pricing derivations
and the Bayesian estimation technique can be found in the Appendix.
2 Model
We begin by describing a standard Taylor (1993) policy rule without policy shifts and then
introduce shifts in inﬂation and output gap responses in Section 2.1. We model factor dynamics
in Section 2.2 and compute bond prices in Section 2.3.
2.1 Policy Rules
2.1.1 Rule with No Policy Shifts
In a standard Taylor (1993) policy rule, the monetary authority sets the short rate as a linear
function of inﬂation and the output gap:
rt = ±0 + ¹ agt +¹ b¼t + f
std
t ; (1)
where rt is the short rate which we take to be the three-month T-bill yield, gt is the output gap,
and ¼t is inﬂation.8 In this speciﬁcation, the Fed response to output and inﬂation in the system-
atic component of monetary policy, ±0 + ¹ agt +¹ b¼t, is held ﬁxed. The mean-zero residual in the
Created the Financial Crisis,” Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2009.
8 The original Taylor (1993) rule was applied to the federal funds rate (FFR). We follow Cogley and Sargent
(2001), Ang and Piazzesi (2003), and many others by using the three-month T-bill, which has a correlation of
96.7% with the FFR over 1954:Q3 to 2007:Q4 (the FFR is unavailable in the beginning nine quarters of our full
sample). Several reasons for the difference between T-bill yields and FFRs are greater liquidity for T-bills, the
ability of T-bills to be used as collateral, and default risk (the FFR embeds default risk while T-bills do not). We
use the T-bill yield as the basic building block because it has the same maturity as the quarterly frequency of the
5standard policy rule, fstd
t , can be interpreted as a monetary policy shock where the superscript
“std” refers to a standard Taylor rule. If fstd
t is correlated with the macro variables gt and ¼t
then OLS does not yield consistent estimates of the Fed responses ¹ a and ¹ b to output gap and
inﬂation shocks, respectively. However, Ang, Dong and Piazzesi (2006), Bikbov and Chernov
(2006), and others show that ft can be identiﬁed by the movements of long-term bond prices
in a no-arbitrage model. Ang and Piazzesi (2003) show that estimating equation (1) yields a
process of ft that is very persistent and is highly correlated with short rate movements. We
refer to the policy rule in equation (1) as the constant Taylor rule.
Our Taylor rule speciﬁcation assumes that the policy instrument used by the Fed throughout
thisperiodistheshortterminterestrate. Thismightseematoddswithsomeanecdotalevidence,
including some Fed ofﬁcial statements, suggesting that the Fed has used different instruments at
different points in time. For instance, between 1979 and 1982, the Fed was ofﬁcially targeting
non-borrowed reserves. In practice, however, existing evidence suggests that using the short
term interest is a good approximation to the operating procedure followed by Fed throughout
that period, at least outside of the 1979-1982 period.9 This is why most of the empirical litera-
ture modeling the Fed’s behavior speciﬁes a policy reaction function in terms of the short term
interest rate.10 In fact, all the existing evidence on changes in the conduct of monetary policy
of which we are aware, including the evidence cited in this paper, is based on this assumption.
Still, the fact remains that this assumption might be more problematic between 1979 and 1982,
and we should keep in mind that this could contaminate our results for this period. However,
this would not explain why the changes have persisted outside 1979-1982. In particular, this
could not explain the fact that we observe a dramatically different conduct of monetary in the
1970s versus the 1980s, or during the early 2000s.
macro variables, the model is speciﬁed at the quarterly frequency, and, like the other Treasury bonds used in the
estimation, it is a risk-free rate.
9 Bernanke and Mihov (1998) estimate parameters describing the operating procedure of the Fed over time.
They ﬁnd that the Fed followed something very close to an interest rate target since the 1950s, except perhaps
between the Volcker non-borrowed reserved targeting experiment between 1979 and 1982. Cook (1989) argues
that the Fed funds rate is a good indicator of monetary policy even during 1979-1982.
10 Notable exceptions are Bakshi and Chen (1996) and Burashi and Jiltsov (2005) who specify a policy reaction
function in terms of a money aggregate.
62.1.2 Rules with Policy Shifts
In order to capture the changing responses of the Federal Reserve to the macro environment, we
let the policy responses on output and inﬂation vary over time. In our benchmark speciﬁcation
we set the systematic component of monetary policy to be
rt = ±0 + atgt + bt¼t; (2)
where the policy responses to gt and ¼t are stochastic processes. If there has been no change to
the Fed’s policy reaction function, then at = ¹ a and bt = ¹ b for all t, otherwise time variation in
at and bt represent policy shifts in the relative importance of output gap or inﬂation shocks in
the Fed’s policy rule.
The monetary policy rule with policy shifts in equation (2) can be written in a similar form
of the standard time-invariant Taylor rule in (1) by redeﬁning the policy shock to explicitly
depend on the level of the output gap and inﬂation combined with a time-varying policy stance:
rt = ±0 + (¹ a + at ¡ ¹ a)gt + (¹ b + bt ¡¹ b)¼t
= ±0 + ¹ agt +¹ b¼t + [(at ¡ ¹ a)gt + (bt ¡¹ b)¼t]
= ±0 + ¹ agt +¹ b¼t + f
bmk
t (3)
where the redeﬁned discretionary policy shock is fbmk
t = (at ¡ ¹ a)gt + (bt ¡ ¹ b)¼t, where the
superscript “bmk” refers to the implied policy shock from our benchmark speciﬁcation. Our
estimations show that (at¡¹ a)gt+(bt¡¹ b)¼t is highly correlated with the linear factor fstd
t from
the constant Taylor rule (2). Thus, the constant Taylor rule may potentially confuse changes in
systematic policy reaction components with true discretionary shocks. Previous research like
Ang, Dong and Piazzesi (2006) has also shown that latent linear factors like ft are correlated
with output and inﬂation. In our setup, we decompose this traditional ft term into policy shifts
by the Fed (the (at ¡ ¹ a) and (bt ¡¹ b) terms) and separate shocks to the output gap and inﬂation
components.
In a ﬁnal speciﬁcation, we consider the possibility that there is also a linear policy shock in
addition to the time-varying policy shifts in the benchmark speciﬁcation in (2):
rt = ±0 + atgt + bt¼t + f
ext
t ; (4)
where we specify fext
t to be orthogonal to at and gt. We refer to equation (4) as the extended
model. We ﬁnd that by allowing the policy shifts at and bt, the effect of the monetary policy
shock factor fext
t becomes small. Thus, in presenting our results we concentrate on the bench-
mark model, but also compare our results across the models.
72.2 Factor Dynamics
We collect the macro and policy variables in the state vector Xt = [gt ¼t at bt ft]>, where ft
is either fstd
t in the constant Taylor rule or fext
t in the extended Taylor rule, which follows the
stationary VAR:
Xt = ¹ + ©Xt¡1 + §"t; (5)
where "t » IID N(0;I). We order the macro variables ﬁrst in the VAR. The constant Taylor
rule and benchmark speciﬁcations omit the dynamics of (at; bt) and ft, respectively, and are
special cases of the extended model.
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The upper 2 £ 2 matrix of © represents a regular VAR of output and inﬂation. The coefﬁcients
©ga and ©¼b allow changes in the policy coefﬁcients to inﬂuence the future path of output and
inﬂation.11 Similarly, non-zero ©gf and ©¼f imply that discretionary linear policy shocks affect
output and inﬂation next period. Previous research by Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000) and
many others ﬁnd negative estimates of ©¼f so tighter monetary policy reduces future inﬂation.
We capture an endogenous response of the Fed policy to changing output and inﬂation in the
coefﬁcients ©ag and ©b¼. Speciﬁcally, we allow the response of inﬂation and output to depend
on whether past inﬂation or output is high or low. If ©b¼ is positive, then the Fed becomes more
aggressive in responding to inﬂation shocks when past inﬂation is high.12
11 We do not allow the Fed’s response to inﬂation to inﬂuence the future output gap or the Fed’s output gap
sensitivity to inﬂuence future inﬂation (©gb = ©¼a = 0). In systems with latent factors, the same reduced-form
model may often be produced by arbitrarily scaling or shifting the coefﬁcients governing the dynamics of at and
bt in © or §. To identify at and bt, we allow their shocks to be correlated in §, but do not allow any feedback
between at and bt in ©.
12 A version of the Lucas critique would suggest that the time variation in the policy rule could imply time
variation in the upper left 2£2 block of the matrix ©. Unfortunately, modeling this time variation takes us outside
the tractable class of quadratic term structure models (see below) and we can no longer derive long-term bond
prices. In our current setup, the ﬁrst two equations have thus to be interpreted as a ﬁrst-order approximation to the
true dynamics of these two variables.
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Our speciﬁcation of § allows inﬂation, output and policy shifts to be contemporaneously cor-
related. We also specify that conditional shocks to ft are orthogonal to all other factors as an
identifying assumption.
We treat the policy variables, at and bt, and the policy shock factor, ft as latent factors.
We are especially interested in the variation of at and bt through the sample. We assume that
the time variation in the policy coefﬁcients is a covariance stationary process, that is all the
eigenvalues of © lie inside the unit circle. Under our formulation, agents form expectations
taking into account the probability that monetary policy will shift in the future according to a
knownstationarylawofmotion. Thatis, agentsknowthatmonetarypolicyhaschangedandwill
change again. Our speciﬁcation thus accounts for a version of the Lucas critique, in the spirit
of the Sims’ perspective on policy intervention in a rational expectations context (see Sargent,
1984; Sims, 1987). Furthermore, the time variation of at and bt is also allowed to endogenously
depend on past macro variables, as is potentially the future path of gt and ¼t allowed to depend
on the current monetary policy stance. Since the persistence of the process could be estimated
to be arbitrarily high, our setup can approximate the random walk speciﬁcation that have been
used in previous studies (see, among others, Cooley and Prescott, 1976; Cogley and Sargent,
2001, 2005; Cogley, 2005; Boivin, 2006; Justiniano and Primiceri, 2006).
The benchmark Taylor rule with changing policy stances (equation (2)) and the extended
version which also incorporates additional policy shocks (equation (4)) are examples of regres-
sion models with stochastically varying coefﬁcients. Using only macro data and short rates,
these systems may be asymptotically identiﬁed (see Pagan, 1980). However, it is hard to use
only one observable variable, short rates, to identify two or more latent processes in small sam-
ples. Fortunately, it is not only the short rate that responds to policy shifts – we identify the
variation in at, bt, and ft by using information from the entire yield curve. A further advantage
of using the entire term structure is that we can identify the prices of risk that agents assign
to the policy authority’s time-varying policy rules. Thus, we can infer the effect on long-term
yields of a policy shift by the Fed on its inﬂation stance, as well as the traditional analysis of
9tracing through the effect of an inﬂation shock on the term structure. We now show how bond
prices embed the dynamics of all factors through no arbitrage.
2.3 Bond Prices
To derive bond prices from the policy shift model of equation (2), we write the short rate as a
quadratic function of the factors Xt = [gt ¼t at bt ft]>:
rt = ±0 + ±
>
1 Xt + X
>
t ­Xt (8)
where ±0 is a scalar and ±1 = [0 0 0 0 1]>, which picks up the linear factor ft. In the quadratic
term X>













0 0 0 1
2 0
1
2 0 0 0 0
0 1
2 0 0 0











The short rate is linear in the observable macro variables and the quadratic form results from the
interaction of the stochastic policy coefﬁcients at and bt with the macro factors gt and ¼t. The
constant Taylor rule model is a standard afﬁne term structure model where at and bt are constant
at at = ¹ a and bt = ¹ b and the vector of loadings in the short rate takes the form ±1 = [¹ a ¹ b 1]> for
the factors [g ¼ fstd]>.













with the time-varying prices of risk depending on the state variables Xt following Duffee (2002)
and others:
¸t = ¸0 + ¸1Xt; (11)
for the 4 £ 1 vector ¸0 and the 4 £ 4 matrix ¸1. The prices of risk control the response of
long-term yields to macro and policy shocks and cause the expected holding period returns of
long-term bonds to vary over time (see Dai and Singleton, 2002). We can rewrite equation (10)













































t ]>. If a risk is not priced, then the
corresponding row of ¸t is equal to zero and payoffs of an asset correlated with those factor
innovations receive no risk premium. Of particular interest are the risk premia parameters ¸a
t
and ¸b
t on the policy shift variables at and bt. These have not been examined before because
the prices of risk in equation (11) have almost exclusively been employed in traditional afﬁne
macro-term structure models where the policy coefﬁcients are constant (see, for example, Ang
and Piazzesi, 2003).







t is the price of a zero-coupon bond of maturity n quarters at time t. Equivalently we

















t denotes the expectation under the risk-neutral probability measure Q, under which
the dynamicsof the statevector Xt are characterizedby the risk-neutral constantand companion
form matrix:
¹
Q = ¹ ¡ §¸0
©
Q = © ¡ §¸1; (13)




under Q. In our estimation, we impose ©Q to take the same restrictions as the companion form
under the real measure, ©, given in equation (6). The relevant dynamics for bond prices are
given by the risk-neutral parameters ¹Q and ©Q.
The quadratic short rate (2) or (8), combined with the linear VAR in equation (5), and the
pricing kernel (10) gives rise to a quadratic term structure model. We can write the bond price
for maturity n implied by the model as:
P
n
t = exp(An + B
>
n Xt + X
>
t CnXt); (14)
where the terms An, Bn, and Cn are given in Appendix A. Hence, if we denote the yield on a
zero-coupon bond with maturity n quarters as yn
t = ¡1=nlogP n









where an = ¡An=n, bn = ¡Bn=n, and cn = ¡Cn=n. This analytical form enables the
estimation of the model and allows us to investigate how the entire term structure responds to
policy changes and macro shocks.
We deﬁne an excess holding period return as the return on holding a long-term bond in










where the notation xhprn
t+1 denotes that the excess holding period return applies to a zero
coupon bond of n periods today at time t. The conditional expected excess holding period
return implied by the model is also given by a quadratic function:
Et[xhpr
n
t+1] = ¹ An + ¹ B
>
n Xt + X
>
t ¹ CnXt; (16)
where the coefﬁcients ¹ An, ¹ Bn and ¹ Cn are given in Appendix A.
Since the yields are quadratic functions of the state variables, the model belongs to the class
of quadratic term structure models developed by Longstaff (1989), Beaglehold and Tenney
(1992), Constantinides (1992), Leippold and Wu (2002, 2003), and Ahn, Dittmar and Gallant
(2002).13 None of these authors incorporate observable macro factors or investigate policy
shifts. Ahn, Dittmar and Gallant (2002) and Brandt and Chapman (2003) demonstrate that
quadratic models have several advantages over the Dufﬁe and Kan (1996) afﬁne class in adding
more ﬂexibility to better match conditional moments of yields and matching correlations across
yields. The non-linearity of yields also aids in estimating prices of risk because there is an addi-
tional source of identiﬁcation, through the non-linear mapping of state variables to yields, that
is absent in an afﬁne setting. Our model naturally shares these advantages. However, while we
share the main technical methodology of the general class of quadratic term structure models,
in our setting the quadratic structure arises naturally by allowing policy shifts in a Taylor pol-
icy rule, rather than immediately assuming the use of a quadratic term structure model. Thus,
we provide some economic interpretation behind a general quadratic term structure model and
interpret the factors and prices of risk in an interesting and important policy application.
13 These quadratic models are related to the broader class of Wishart term structure models as they have linear
representations of yields involving factors Xt and second moments of factors, vech(XtX0
t). In these models, the
quadratic term itself follows an afﬁne process, as shown by Filipovic and Teichmann (2002) and Gourieroux and
Sufana (2003). Buraschi, Cieslak and Trojani (2007) show that the quadratic short rate process can be supported
in a Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) production economy with a representative agent.
12To estimate the model, we assume that all yields, including the short rate, are measured with









t is the model-implied yield in equation (15), ~ yn
t is the yield observed in data, and un
t
IID » N(0;¾2
n), are additive measurement errors for all yields n. The quadratic form of the
yields implies that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between certain yields assumed to
be observed without error and latent state variables. Thus, standard Kalman ﬁltering techniques
for estimating afﬁne models cannot be used to estimate our quadratic term structure model. We
employ a Bayesian ﬁltering algorithm that requires no approximation to estimate the model,
which we detail in Appendix B.
3 Data
All our data is at a quarterly frequency and the sample period is from June 1952 to December









where Qt is real GDP and Q¤
t is potential GDP. We obtain real GDP from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA), which is produced using chained 2000 dollars. We use the measure of
potential output published by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) in the Budget and Eco-
nomic Outlook using chained 1996 dollars. To make the BEA series comparable to the CBO
series, we translate real GDP to 1996 dollars. Finally, we demean the output gap and divide the
output gap by four to correspond to quarterly units. Since we will be using per quarter short
rates, this allows us to read the coefﬁcient on the output gap as an annualized number. Our series
for inﬂation is the year-on-year GDP deﬂator expressed as a continuously compounded growth
rate. This is also divided by four to be in per quarter units. In addition to the one-quarter short
rate, our term structure of interest rates comprises take zero-coupon bond yields from CRSP of
maturities 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20 quarters. These are all expressed as continuously compounded
yields per quarter.
Figure 1 plots the output gap, inﬂation, and the short rate over our sample in annualized
terms. The output gap decreases during all the NBER recessions and reaches a low of -7.1%
during the 1981:Q3 to 1983:Q4 recession. The output gap strongly trends upwards during
the expansions of the 1960’s, the mid-1980’s, and the 1990’s. Inﬂation is slightly negatively
13correlated with the output gap at -0.245. Inﬂation rises to near 10% during the mid-1970’s and
early 1980’s, but otherwise remains below 5%. In the data, the correlation between the output
gap and the short rate is -0.147 and the correlation between inﬂation and the short rate is 0.698.
These correlations are matched closely by the model, with implied correlations of gt and ¼t with
the short rate of -0.135 and 0.788, respectively.
As a benchmark, we report OLS estimates of simple Taylor (1993) rules where the short
rate is a linear combination of macro factors and lagged inﬂation:
rt = 0.005 + 0.025 gt + 0.906 ¼t + "t,
(0.001) (0.059) (0.063)
(19)
where standard errors are reported in parentheses. Adding lagged short rates we obtain
rt = 0.000 + 0.072 gt + 0.143 ¼t + 0.872 rt¡1 + "t,
(0.000) (0.028) (0.040) (0.031)
(20)
which can be written in partial adjustment format as:
rt = 0:001 + 0:872rt¡1 + (1 ¡ 0:872)(0:562gt + 1:117¼t) + "t:
These estimates are very similar to those reported in the literature. We report these OLS coefﬁ-
cients for comparison. In our model, the latent factor fstd
t in the constant Taylor rule or extended
model and the redeﬁned residual term fbmk
t = (at ¡ ¹ a)gt + (bt ¡¹ b)¼t in the benchmark model
are correlated with the regressors. This implies that our estimated (time-varying) loadings may
be potentially different from the OLS estimates.
In Table 1 we report summary statistics of the factors in data and implied by the bench-
mark model. The factors and yields are expressed in percentage terms at a quarterly frequency.
The model provides a good match to the data, with model-implied unconditional means and
standard deviations very close to the moments in data. In Panel A, the unconditional moments
of the output gap and inﬂation implied by the model are well within 95% conﬁdence bounds
of the data estimates. Panel B of Table 1 compares the yields in data with the model-implied
yields. We construct the posterior moments of the model-implied yields by using the generated
latent factors in each iteration from the Gibbs sampler estimation. The tight posterior standard
deviations indicate that the draws of the latent at and bt factors in the estimation result in yields
that very closely lie around the data yields. All of the model-implied estimates are very similar
to the data. Note that we match the mean of the short rate exactly in the estimation.
144 Empirical Results
Section 4.1 discusses the parameter estimates starting from the constant Taylor rule model and
working up to the extended model. Section 4.2 documents how the Fed reaction to output gap
and inﬂation shocks have changed over time. In Section 4.3, we discuss how the yield curve
reacts to changes in the Fed’s policy parameters. Section 4.4 characterizes risk premia of long-
term bonds. In Section 4.5, we present a counter-factual experiment of how the yield curve in
the early 2000s might have been had the Fed not lowered its output gap and inﬂation stance as
much as it did during this time.
4.1 Parameter Estimates
We report parameter estimates of the constant Taylor rule model in Table 2, the benchmark
model in Table 3, and the extended model in Table 4. Each table reports posterior means of the
model parameters, with posterior standard deviations in parentheses.
Across all speciﬁcations we ﬁnd that high inﬂation Granger-causes lower economic growth
and higher economic activity Granger-causes higher inﬂation consistent with a Phillips curve.
For example, in the benchmark speciﬁcation ©g¼ = ¡0:083 with a posterior standard devia-
tion of 0.036 and ©¼g = 0:064 with a posterior standard deviation of 0.011. In the conditional
covariance matrix, §, conditional shocks to the output gap and inﬂation have almost zero cor-
relation. These effects have been noted before in standard VAR macro models like Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (1996, 1999). Consistent with previous macro-afﬁne models estimated
in the literature, there are several signiﬁcant price of risk parameters for gt and ¼t indicating
that macro risk plays an important role in bond pricing.
4.1.1 Constant Taylor Rule Model
Table 2 reports that for the constant Taylor rule model the policy rule is given by
rt = 0.008 + 0.364 gt + 0.609 ¼t + fstd
t ,
(0.002) (0.063) (0.237)
which are different to the OLS estimates in equation (19) as the policy shock factor fstd
t has
an unconditional correlation with gt and ¼t of 7.2% and -16.4%, respectively. In particular,
the long-term output gap response ¹ a = 0:364 compared to the OLS estimate of 0.025 and the
long-term inﬂation response is ¹ b = 0:609 compared to the OLS estimate of 0.906.
15Not surprisingly, Table 2 shows that the fstd factor is highly persistent with ©ff = 0:940
as fstd inherits the high autocorrelation of the short rate. The correlation of fstd with the short
rate is 0.849. Thus, in common with other afﬁne estimations like Ang and Piazzesi (2003),
f is a “level” factor in the sense of Knez, Litterman and Scheinkman (1994) and affects all
yields across the term structure in a parallel fashion. Table 2 shows there is some evidence that
high f values Granger-cause lower economic activity and lower inﬂation with coefﬁcients of
©gf = ¡0:023and©¼f = ¡0:015. Whilestatisticallyweak, thesecoefﬁcientsareeconomically
consistent with previous estimates in the literature that monetary policy shocks inﬂuence future
inﬂation and output.
4.1.2 Benchmark Model
In the benchmark model the response of the Fed to the output gap and inﬂation vary through
time. In Table 3 we report two estimates for the long-run Fed responses, which we refer to
as ¹ a and ¹ b. The ﬁrst “sample” estimate is the average posterior values of at and bt over the
sample. The second long-run estimate is the population long-run mean implied by the VAR.
Both estimates are similar to each other. The sample long-run response to the output gap is
¹ a = 0:356 with a posterior standard deviation of 0.047. The long-run inﬂation response in the
sample is¹ b = 1:117 with a posterior standard deviation of 0.138. The corresponding population
VAR-implied long-run values are very similar at ¹ a = 0:372 and ¹ b = 1:154, respectively.14
According to the benchmark model, the long-run inﬂation response of ¹ b = 1:154 is higher
than the OLS estimate of 0.906 in equation (19) and is also higher than the constant Taylor rule
estimate of 0.609 in Table 2. This suggests that the time variation of at and bt plays an important
role in determining the short rate. We further explore the policy shift dynamics of the output
gap and inﬂation responses below.
The benchmark model’s implied policy factor, fbmk
t , in equation (3) is dependent on the
time-varying at and bt coefﬁcients and should be highly correlated with the latent fstd
t factor
from the model with the constant Taylor rule. This is indeed the case with a correlation of 0.864
between fstd
t and fbmk
t . Thus, most of the variation of a standard linear policy factor is attributed
to time-varying policy stances in the benchmark model.
Table 3 shows there is little evidence that changes in at and bt affect the future path of output
14 The posterior standard deviations for the VAR-implied values are larger the sample estimates because the
population-implied value from the VAR can takes a wider range of values, especially when a simulated value for
© is close to the unit circle.
16and inﬂation, with estimates of ©ga = ©¼b = 0. In contrast, we ﬁnd large endogenous responses
of the Fed to the macro environment, but these estimates have posterior standard deviations that
are quite wide. A 1% increase in the output gap lowers at by 1.114, with a posterior standard
deviation of 0.763, and a 1% increase in inﬂation increases bt by 2.682, but this coefﬁcient has
a fairly large posterior standard deviation of 2.595. Thus, overall we ﬁnd only weak statistical
evidence that monetary policy stances endogenously respond to past output gap and inﬂation
realizations.
In the conditional volatility matrix, the conditional shocks of at and bt have a correlation of
85.4%witheachotherindicatingthattheFedislikelytoraiseorlowertheresponsesoninﬂation
and output simultaneously. Conditional shocks to the macro factors and at and bt have relatively
low correlations, but some of these are signiﬁcant. The conditional correlation of shocks to ¼t
and shocks to at and bt are -0.332 and -0.203, respectively, with posterior standard deviations
of 0.077 and 0.075. This implies that the Fed has a slight tendency to lower its stances to macro
shocks at times when larger macro shocks are expected. The conditional volatility matrix also
reveals that the conditional volatility of bt is 0.048 and is approximately 10 times the conditional
volatility of at, so the Fed’s stance to output gap shocks has been much more stable than the
Fed’s response to inﬂation. Below, we further investigate the time-series variation of at and bt.
4.1.3 Extended Model
Table 4 reports the estimates of the extended model, which are largely similar to the benchmark
model for the common parameters. The estimates of the long-run Fed responses to the output
gap and inﬂation are also very similar across the benchmark and extended models. For example,
the sample long-run inﬂation response is 1.075 in the full model and 1.117 in the benchmark
model. Similar to the benchmark model, we ﬁnd weak evidence of Granger-causality of past
inﬂation to next-period bt values. In the extended model, ©b¼ = 2:952, with a posterior standard
deviation of 2.334, compared to ©b¼ = 2:682 with a posterior standard deviation of 2.595 in the
benchmark model.
The extended model has a linear latent fext
t model in addition to time-varying policy load-
ings. Table 4 shows that the conditional volatility of fext
t is 0:007£10¡3 which is several orders
of magnitude smaller than the conditional volatilities of the policy shift parameters at and bt,
which are 0.003 and 0.036, respectively. The correlation between fext
t and the short rate is low at
0.228 and thus must of the movements in the short rate come from changing gt and ¼t interacted
with monetary policy shifts. Put another way, time-varying at and bt in the benchmark mone-
17tary policy shock, fbmk
t accounts for most of the movements of the short rate, and the extended
model’s remainder monetary policy effect, fext
t , plays a relatively small role in explaining short
rate movements.
This is also seen in a formal variance decomposition of the short rate, where fext accounts





where varf(r) is the variance of the short rate computed through the sample where fext is set to
be constant at its sample mean and var(r) is the variance of the short rate in data.15 In contrast,
the corresponding variance decomposition for fbmk in the benchmark model is 0.257. This is as
expected. The benchmark model already allows the output gap and inﬂation response to vary
over time and further allowing an independent fext factor in addition to the at and bt variation
indicates that the role of fext is small. Furthermore, since the estimated time-series paths of at
and bt are very similar across the benchmark and the extended models, we concentrate on the
benchmark model for looking at how Fed policy shifts have changed over time, which we turn
to next.
4.2 Policy Shifts in Output and Inﬂation Responses
4.2.1 Short Rate Components
In the benchmark model, short rates move due to movements in the output gap component, atgt,
or movements in the inﬂation component, bt¼t. A formal variance decomposition is given by
(See Appendix C for details):
var(rt) = var(atgt) + var(bt¼t) + 2cov(atgt; bt¼t)
100% = 7.74% 98.67% -6.41%
Thus, almost all movements in the short rate are attributable to inﬂation and the Fed response
to inﬂation. The variation of the output component of the short rate is relatively very small.
Although the unconditional standard deviation (in annual terms) in the output gap and inﬂation
are similar at 2.35% and 2.20% for gt and ¼t, respectively (see Table 1), the smaller policy
responses on output shocks and the relatively larger responses on inﬂation cause the inﬂation
component to dominate.
15 The variance decompositions of long-term yields in the extended model in terms of fext are also very small.
For example, the variance decomposition for the 20-quarter yield for fext is 0.008.
18Figure 2 reports the decomposition of the short rate into these two components in the bench-
mark model. The policy factors are evaluated at the best estimates of at and bt through the
sample, together with the short rate. The correlation between the actual short rate and the ﬁtted
components ±0 + atgt + bt¼t is 0.976, indicating that movements in the macro variables and
policy rule account for almost all of the variation in the short rate and the observation error
component is small. The bottom panel of Figure 2 visually conﬁrms the very high attribution to
bt¼t in the variance decomposition of the short rate by clearly demonstrating that the inﬂation
components shadow the level of the short rate while the output gap terms are relatively stable.
Figure3displaysthepolicyparametersat andbt overthesamplefromthebenchmarkmodel.
We plot the mean posterior estimates at each point in time of the Fed’s response to output and
inﬂation produced by the Gibbs sampler, along with two posterior standard deviations. There
are two main differences between the Fed’s output gap and inﬂation responses. First, the overall
variation of the output gap loading is small compared to the inﬂation loading variation. The
sample standard deviation of the posterior mean of at is 0.167 compared to 0.552 for the bt
loadings. Thus, the Fed has exhibited relatively little change in its responsiveness to economic
growth and comparatively large changes in its inﬂation response.16
Second, the Fed places relatively more importance on responding to inﬂation than it does to
the output gap. The inﬂation loading in the second panel of Figure 3 has a long-run mean of
¹ b = 1:117 compared to ¹ a = 0:356 and ranges from a low of 0.08 in 2003:Q3 to a high of 2.43
in 1983:Q4. These estimates lend support to the conjecture that the changes in monetary policy,
at least to inﬂation, during this period were substantial.
4.2.2 Shifts in Inﬂation Stance
We now comment in detail on changes in Fed sensitivities to inﬂation plotted in the bottom
panel of Figure 3. The response to inﬂation during the 1950s starts well below one at around
0.2 and sharply increases to above 2 during the late 1950s. In the last quarter of 1959 bt reaches
a temporary high of 2.23. From this high, the Fed’s inﬂation coefﬁcient starts to decrease during
the 1960s, dips below one in the mid-1960s and stays low through the 1970s until 1979-1980.
For instance, by the end of the 1970 recession, the response to inﬂation is less than 0.5.
In the late 1970s the Fed’s inﬂation response starts to increase. Interestingly, and as in
16 A previous version of the paper shows that there is signiﬁcantly more variation in the output gap loading when
the additional term structure information that this model brings to bear on the identiﬁcation of policy stances is
ignored. These results are available upon request.
19Boivin (2006), the sharpest increase in the inﬂation response is not in late 1979, as is often
assumed because of the appointment of Volcker in July 1979, but after 1981. At the beginning
of January 1979 bt starts out at 1.17 and reaches a high of 2.42 in June 1984. From this high
the inﬂation loading starts to decrease over the 1980s and early 1990s. In 1992:Q3 bt decreases
to 0.68 before increasing to 2.05 in December 1994. Interestingly, this increase is completely
consistent with anecdotal accounts of the Fed’s “preemptive strike on inﬂation,” which is the
name given to this unprecedented episode as the Fed started to tighten monetary policy well
before any concrete signs of inﬂation started to materialize (see Beckner, 1996, for further
details on these events).
Recently the response to inﬂation falls well below one during the 2001 recession and the
aftermath of the September 2001 terrorism acts. Speciﬁcally, the short rate declines from 4.25%
in 2001:Q1 to 0.90% in 2003:Q2. During this time the Fed’s response to inﬂation shocks also
sinks below one in 2001:Q1 to 0.98 reaching a low of 0.08 in 2003:Q3. Thus, we ﬁnd that
the last few years of monetary policy under Greenspan was similar to monetary policy in the
1950s and 1970s with policy coefﬁcients of inﬂation below one. From the low in 2003:Q3 to
the 2007:Q2, the Fed response to inﬂation increases sharply, rising above one in 20055:Q4 to a
value of 1.45 in 2007:Q2. Our estimates indicate a slight decrease in the inﬂation loading during
the second part of 2007 associated with the beginning of the current ﬁnancial and economic
crisis.
The time-series pattern of the inﬂation coefﬁcient is in broad agreement with the evidence
reported in Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000), Cogley and Sargent (2005), and Boivin (2006). In
general, we ﬁnd a low response to inﬂation in the 1970s and much higher response in the early
1980s. The response in most of the 1960s and 1970s is such that a unit increase in inﬂation
translates into a less than a unit increase in the nominal policy rate, thus a decline in the real
rate, and hence implies an easing of monetary policy. If agents had been expecting the response
to inﬂation to remain permanently below one, it might have been possible for inﬂation expecta-
tions, and thus economic ﬂuctuations, to be driven by non-fundamental sunspot shocks. Some
commentators argue that the failure to rule out the presence of such shocks is responsible for
the greater economic volatility of the 1970s (see the discussion by Taylor, 1999; Clarida, Gal´ ı
and Gertler, 2000). It is important to note that in the context of our model, however, agents
understand that the response to inﬂation shift in the future. As long as they believe that the
long-run mean of the response to inﬂation is above one, sunspot ﬂuctuations should be ruled
out, even if the response is temporarily below one.
20It is also reassuring to observe that the secular evolution of our estimates of inﬂation stances
is also consistent with the evolution of the intellectual debate and development of monetary
policy theory. In particular, Romer and Romer (2002) argue that this evolution has not been
a linear improvement in the understanding of the economy, but rather “it is a more interesting
evolution from a crude but fundamentally sensible model of how the economy worked in the
1950s, to more formal but faulty models in the 1960s and 1970s, and ﬁnally to a model that was
both sensible and sophisticated in the 1980s and 1990s.” This lines up well with our estimated
responsetoinﬂation, wheremonetarypolicyinthelate1950sisquitesimilartotheoneobserved
in the early 1980s under Volcker and in the mid-1990s under Greenspan.
Interestingly, the more recent evidence suggests that monetary policy in the 2003-2004 pe-
riod is closer to monetary policy observed in the 1970s with both periods having inﬂation re-
sponses below one. However, there is an important difference with the 1970s: during the 2003-
2004 episode, the Fed was concerned about the possibility of deﬂation. Since we are modeling
the Fed’s response to contemporaneous inﬂation, the estimated decline in the response to inﬂa-
tion could be explained by expected deﬂation at the time that was not reﬂected in current in-
ﬂation. This explanation requires that the historical relationship between the Fed’s forecast for
inﬂation at that point in time and other macro variables broke down during that period. Whether
it is due to markedly different forecasts for inﬂation or an actual change in the Fed’s response
to inﬂation, this period certainly stands out as unusual relative to our historical estimates.
A ﬁnal comment is that the timing of monetary policy shifts in Figure 3 is broadly consistent
with the general increase in volatility in the 1960s and 1970s and the general decline of macro
volatility in the mid-1980s, suggesting monetary policy could have played a signiﬁcant role in
this pattern of change in inﬂation and economic growth.17 This view might be reinforced by the
fact that the increased volatility in the last few years of our sample is preceded, according to our
estimates, by a substantial reduction in the response to inﬂation between 2003-2004. However,
this remains highly speculative at this stage.
4.3 Policy Shifts and the Yield Curve
To gauge how important each factor is in determining the dynamics of yields, we compute
unconditional variance decompositions in Table 5. Movements in GDP growth account for only
a small proportion of yield curve movements whereas inﬂation accounts for 60.3% of short
17 This issue is explored by, among others, Stock and Watson (2003), Boivin and Giannoni (2006), Sims and Zha
(2006), and Justiniano and Primiceri (2006).
21rate movements and 19.1% of long rate movements. Time-varying output gap loadings have
their greatest impact on yield variation at the middle part of the yield curve with a variance
decomposition reaching 11.6% at at a one-year maturity. Similarly, the attribution of yield
variance to movements in bt is the highest at a two-year maturity with a value of 27.5%. The
majority of yield variation is given by the inﬂation term bt¼t for all maturities, which echoes the
high comovement between bt¼t and the short rate in Figure 8. These variance decompositions
suggest that the main determinants of yield curve variation are inﬂation and inﬂation loadings.
In Figure 4 we plot the impulse response of the yield curve to macro shocks and inﬂation
policy shifts. Since the yields are non-linear functions of macro and policy variables, we com-
pute the impulse responses numerically, which we detail in Appendix D. We graph in columns
the response of an unconditional one-standard deviation shock to each factor and trace the ef-
fect on the short rate rt, the 20-quarter long rate, y20
t , and the yield spread, y20
t ¡ rt, which are
presented in rows. The units on the x-axis are in quarters whereas the impulse responses are
expressed in annualized percentage terms.
In the ﬁrst column, a positive output shock initially increases short rates and decreases
spreads. A unit unconditional standard deviation shock to gt of 2.35% ﬁrst increases the short
rate by 0.79% and reaches a peak of 1.31% at 12 quarters. The effect on the long yield is
smaller, which initially increases by 0.42%. Consequently the term spread initially shrinks by
-0.37% before shrinking to its maximum absolute value of -0.50% at 13 quarters. A similar
pattern is observed for a shock to inﬂation on the yield curve in the second column. A 2.20%
shock to inﬂation causes the short rate to jump 0.93% and shrinks the term spread by 0.66%.
These effects die out faster than the output gap shock, with the effect of an inﬂation shock on
the short rate dying out by 30 quarters. These results are similar to those reported by Ang and
Piazzesi (2003), among many others, who show that the macro shocks have a greater inﬂuence
on the short end of the yield curve compared to the long end of the yield curve.
The third and fourth columns of Figure 4 show the response of the yield curve to monetary
policy shifts. Note that these responses would be the same across the yield curve if monetary
policy shifts were not priced or the price of at and bt risk were constant. The third column
traces the response of an unconditional one standard deviation change in at, which is 0.170.
This causes the short rate to increase to 1.70% and the 20-quarter yield to increase to 0.64%.
Whereas the shock to the long bond dies out quickly after 20 quarters, the shock to at on the
short rate persists up to 40 quarters. Thus, changing the output gap response mostly affects the
short end of the yield curve and causes the term spread to shrink.
22In contrast, the last column shows inﬂation policy shifts affect the long end of the yield
curve more than the short end. In the last column we shock the short rate, long yield, and term
spread by an unconditional one standard deviation shock in bt, which is 0.560. This increases
the short rate by 1.81%, which dies out after 30 quarters. The 20-quarter yield moves almost
twice as much as the short rate to 3.36%. The shock to bt also has a more persistent effect on the
long end of the yield curve than the short rate, which does not reach close to zero until around
40 quarters.
The stronger effect on the long end of the yield curve of changing inﬂation stances compared
to changing economic growth stances is also observed in Figure 5. We plot the yield curve as
a function of maturity in quarters on the x-axis and trace the response of the yield curve after
an initial shock at t = 0 for various t in quarters in rows. The left-hand column, which plots
the effect of a unit unconditional standard deviation shock to at has overall smaller responses,
which die out more quickly, than the term structure responses in the right-hand column, which
traces the effect of an initial unconditional one standard deviation shock to bt. Figure 5 shows
the effect of the shocks to at and bt are monotonic across the yield curve with the at shocks
affecting short maturities more whereas the long end of the yield curve is more sensitive to
changes in bt. After 20 quarters the whole yield curve is still around 50 basis points higher for
the bt shock, with the long yield slightly higher than the short rate, but only the short end of the
yield curve remains around 50 basis points for the at shock. In summary, long-term yields are
especially sensitive to policy changes in inﬂation loadings.
What can explain the stronger effect of bt on long-term yields compared to short-term
yields? In principle, if investors perceived the stronger inﬂation response as implying lower
and less variable inﬂation, it would suggest bt might carry a negative price of risk and long-term
yields may decrease to reﬂect lower risk premia when bt is higher. Instead, according to our
estimates, when bt changes the short rate, and by no arbitrage the entire yield curve, becomes
more exposed to inﬂation risk. This suggests bt carries a positive risk premium. Moreover, since
bt does not affect (or barely affects) the path of future inﬂation, raising bt then causes all bond
prices to be exposed to greater inﬂation and other macro risk – and since bt also responds to
inﬂation but not vice versa, this effect is magniﬁed. Long-maturity bonds pick up this feedback
sensitivity and hence are relatively more sensitive to changes in bt. To investigate this further
we now examine bond risk premia and factor prices of risk.
234.4 Risk Premia
In this section we characterize risk premia of long-term bonds by computing expected excess
holding period returns. We ﬁrst examine impulse responses of risk premia and then directly
examine the price of risk of monetary policy shifts.
4.4.1 Risk Premia Responses
Figure 6 graphs the response of expected excess holding period returns, Et[xhprn
t+1], deﬁned in
equation (16) of the n = 4-quarter bond plotted in the solid line and the n = 20-quarter bond
plotted in the dashed line. The shocks are unit unconditional standard deviation shocks to each
factor and the conditional risk premia are evaluated at the model’s implied unconditional mean.
The top row shows that bond risk premia are strongly counter-cyclical, as documented by many
studies. Positive output gap shocks decrease risk premia with a 2.35% shock to gt producing a
0.32% decrease in the intermediate-term bond risk premium and a 1.96% decrease in the long-
term bond risk premium. These shocks are very persistent and for the long bond do not die
out until after 40 quarters. Similarly, during economic expansions when inﬂation is high, risk
premia also decrease. These responses are relatively larger than the risk premia responses to
the output gap. In particular, a 2.20% inﬂation shock decreases the long-bond risk premium by
2.71%.
The bottom row of Figure 6 shows the risk premia responses to shocks in monetary policy
stances. The 0.170 shock to at increases the risk premium of the four-quarter bond by 0.19%
while the same shock produces a maximum decrease in the 20-quarter bond risk premium of
0.36% after 15 quarters. The non-linear effect comes from the quadratic form and implies that
an unexpected more responsive stance to output gap shocks is felt non-monotonically across the
yield curve with higher risk premia on intermediate-bonds and lower risk premia on long-term
bonds. However, the absolute size of the the risk premia responses to changes in at shocks
is relatively small, which is consistent with the small role that output gap components play in
determining the short rate and term structure.
The lower right-hand panel of Figure 6 shows that risk premia are very responsive to bt
shocks. A 0.560 shock to bt increases the risk premium on the four-quarter bond by 1.79%
and the 20-quarter bond by 6.86%. Both responses die out monotonically and disappear after
40 quarters for the long bond. These responses are large and reﬂect a risk premium for agents
being subject to changing inﬂation policy stances, which we now directly examine.
244.4.2 Interpreting Price of Risk Parameters
To directly interpret the ¸0 and ¸1 price of risk coefﬁcients consider ﬁrst a standard CRRA
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shock to consumption growth. In this economy consider a security paying off "c
t+1, which is a










where the risk-free rate rt = °¹c ¡ 1
2°2¾2
c. Equation (21) shows that the price of this security is
equal to a bond multiplied by minus the degree of risk aversion. The security has a mean zero
payoff since E["c
t+1] = 0. If agents are risk neutral, then the price of the security has the same
zero value as its mean payoff. If agents are risk averse, ° > 0, then the price of the security is
negative. In this case, agents bid down the price of the security below its risk neutral price and
must be paid to bear consumption risk. Consequently, consumption risk carries a positive risk
premium.
In the term structure model there is no direct correspondence to representative risk aversion
because there are multiple shocks, the prices of risk vary over time, and the prices of risk of at
and bt also depend on the correlated movements of gt and ¼t as well as each other. Nevertheless,
we can use the difference between the actual price and risk-neutral price of claims to the factor
shocks to provide economic intuition for the policy shift risk priced by the yield curve. The

















¡rt = ¡(¸0 + ¸1Xt)e
¡rt; (22)
where we use the deﬁnition of the pricing kernel in equation (10) and the short rate rt = ±0 +
±>
1 Xt + X>
t ­Xt is also a function of Xt.
Equation (22) carries the same intuition as the simple CRRA economy in equation (21). In
this case the effect of risk aversion is speciﬁed over multiple factors and if the price of a factor
25shock is negative, the risk premium attached to that factor shock is positive, and vice versa. In
the model the prices of risk also depend on the level of the state variables. Note that because
there is no structural representative agent utility in the model, we cannot directly translate the
price of a factor shock to an overall aggregate measure of risk aversion.
Figure 7 plots the price of a unit shock to at and bt as a function of the policy loadings.
We denote with vertical lines the steady-state values of ¹ a = 0:372 and ¹ b = 1:154. Figure 7
shows that both the price of risk of at and the price of risk of bt are positive indicating that
agents demand a risk premium for bearing at and bt factor shocks. Note that the pure factor risk
prices do not translate directly into a one-to-one relation into risk premia, as Figure 6 shows.
This happens even in an afﬁne model because multiple factors are correlated, but the effects
are exacerbated in our non-linear setting. Nevertheless, for changing inﬂation stances, which
play the most important role in explaining term structure movements, the higher risk premia
on bt shocks when bt is high is consistent with agents demanding higher risk premia on bonds
when bt is high (see Figure 6). Intuitively, when bt is high the entire yield curve becomes more
exposed to inﬂation risk and the risk of bt itself. Agents dislike this risk and bid down the prices
of bonds and increase long-term yields.
It is also possible to price the implied monetary policy shock, fbmk, in equation (3) implied
by the benchmark model:
Et[mt+1f
bmk] = Et[mt+1[(at ¡ ¹ a)gt + (bt ¡¹ b)¼t];
which can be computed in closed form as a function of various quadratic terms. Evaluated at the
posterior mean of all factors, this price is 0.001 and is close to zero for all sample values of the
parameters. Hence, the benchmark model implies that agents apply a price of risk to monetary
policy shifts but not to a linear monetary policy shock.
4.5 The Post-2001 Episode
It is an interesting question to see what the yield curve would have looked like had the Fed not
changed its inﬂation loading over the post-2001 period. Some commentators have raised the
possibility that short-term interest rates were held too low for too long after the Fed lowered in-
terest rates to respond to the September 2001 terrorist attacks and the 2001 recession. However,
during the early 2000s, inﬂation was low, possibly even below an implicit target (see Figure 1)
and the output gap was negative, so interest rates may have declined over this period even with
unchanged policy coefﬁcients. Our model provides a way to precisely quantify at what level
26interest rates would have been in the counter-factual experiment where the Fed did not change
its stance to output or inﬂation in the years following 2001.18
Figure 8 reports the results of a counter-factual experiment where we hold the Fed weight on
the output gap and inﬂation at the average weight of at and bt over 2000 and trace the effects on
the yields post-2001. We allow the other macro factors, gt and ¼t, to take their sample values.
Figure 8 plots the path of the short rate and term spread if the Fed had maintained the same
output and inﬂation stance as in 2000 in the dashed lines and overlays the actual short rate and
term spread in the solid lines.
The top panel of Figure 8 shows that had the Fed not changed its output and inﬂation stances
since 2000, short rates would indeed have been higher post-2001 than in data. During 2002 the
average difference between the actual short rate and the theoretical short rate had the Fed not
changed its policy stance is 1.19%. Thus, even with no additional policy response to the terrorist
attacks and the recession, short term interest rates would have fallen. However, the gap between
the short rate in data and the theoretical short rate with no policy changes widens in 2003
and 2004 to 2.12% and 2.96%, respectively. Short rates reach a minimum level of 0.90% in
2003:Q2, whereas at this time the short rate without any policy shifts would have been 2.74%.
Even in 2005, short rates in data remain considerably below the short rates predicted by the
Fed’s 2000 policy stance with an average difference of 1.37%.
The bottom panel graphs the ﬁve-year term spread. Figure 8 shows that there is qualitatively
little difference between the slope of the yield curve over 2001-2004 comparing actual data and
the counter-factual exercise where the Fed did not take a more dovish stance. The overall
pattern of both the data and the predicted term spread with no policy changes is similar with
both exhibiting an overall decrease post-2001 over the next ﬁve years. In summary, if the Fed
had maintained its output gap and inﬂation stance during 2000 over the early 2000s, the overall
level of the yield curve would have been much higher than observed in data but there would
have been little effect on the slope of the yield curve compared to its data realization. Thus,
the reduction in the response to inﬂation between post-2001 does not explain any part in the
ﬂattening of the yield curve during this period (the so-called Greenspan conundrum).
18 Naturally, like any counter-factual experiment, the usual caveats on the Lucas critique apply since agents
would have reacted differently if they would have known the Fed’s monetary policy stance would be ﬁxed under
the counter-factual.
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Despite how convincing the anecdotal evidence and historical accounts may be, diverging con-
clusions have been reached in the literature concerning the importance, or even the existence, of
changes in the conduct of monetary policy over the last 50 years. The literature has also concen-
trated on using only short rate information to estimate changes in policy stances, but potential
shifts in monetary policy should affect the entire term structure; the actions of the Fed at the
short end of the yield curve inﬂuence the dynamics of the long end of the yield curve through
no-arbitrage restrictions. These shifts in monetary policy are in principle another source of un-
certainty affecting bond risk premia. Thus, long-term bonds provide valuable information on
identifying monetary policy shifts.
In this paper we propose to model monetary policy and the term structure of interest rates
jointly using a quadratic term structure model, where the coefﬁcients of the short rate equation
– which describe the monetary policy response to the state of the economy – can change over
time. The model allows the entire yield curve to be used to estimate potential monetary policy
shifts. Importantly, long-term bonds are priced by agents who care about shifting monetary
policy risk. These agents are not oblivious to the fact that monetary policy changes over time
and take into account future changes in forming prices.
We ﬁnd that monetary policy has changed in quantitatively important ways which are almost
entirely summarized by the evolution of the the Fed’s response to inﬂation. The response of the
Fed to the output gap has remained relatively constant. Our estimates of the time-varying inﬂa-
tion response line up largely with narrative accounts of monetary policy and with some existing
empirical estimates. The Fed’s response to inﬂation lies below one during the 1970s, increases
during the 1980s, and again decreases below one during the early 2000s. The changing response
to inﬂation carries a positive price of risk with an unexpected increase in the Fed’s response to
inﬂation increasing the short rate and increasing the term spread. Intuitively investors perceive
a higher policy loading to inﬂation at the short-end of the yield curve as giving bonds of all
maturities greater exposure to inﬂation and other risk.
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A Bond Pricing
The price of a one-period zero-coupon bond is given by:
P1
t = exp(¡rt) = exp(¡±0 ¡ ±>
1 Xt ¡ X>
t ­Xt)
= exp(A1 + B>
1 Xt + X>
t C1Xt); (A-1)
where A1 = ¡±0, B1 = ¡±1 = ¡[0 0 0 0 1]>, and C1 = ¡­, with ­ given in equation (9).
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To take the expectation, note that the expectation of the exponential of a quadratic Gaussian variable is given by:










for ² » N(0;ª). This can be derived by general properties of Gaussian quadratic forms (see Mathai and Provost,
1992; Searle, 1997).
After taking the expectation and equating the terms with
Pn
t = exp(An + B>
n Xt + X>
t CnXt);
the coefﬁcients An, Bn, and Cn are given by the recursions:
















Cn¡1©Q + 2(§>Bn¡1 + 2§>Cn¡1¹Q)>(I ¡ 2§>Cn¡1§)¡1§>Cn¡1©Q
Cn = ¡­ + ©Q
>
Cn¡1©Q + 2(§>Cn¡1©Q)>(I ¡ 2§>Cn¡1§)¡1(§>Cn¡1©Q) (A-3)
If the model were speciﬁed in continuous time, then the recursions in equation (A-3) are versions of the ordinary
differential equations derived by Ahn, Dittmar and Gallant (2002) on the bond pricing coefﬁcients.
To compute conditional excess holding period returns, we use the exponential quadratic form for zero-coupon









= An¡1 + B>
n¡1Xt+1 + X>
t+1Cn¡1Xt+1 ¡ (An + B>
n Xt + X>
t CnXt)
+(A1 + B>
1 Xt + X>
t C1Xt): (A-4)
Since Xt+1 » N(¹ + ©Xt;§§>), we can write the expectation of a quadratic form, Et(X>
t+1CXt+1), as:
Et(X>
t+1CXt+1) = tr(C§§>) + (¹ + ©Xt)>C(¹ + ©Xt):
This allows us to compute the expectation as:
Et[xhprn
t+1] = ¹ An + ¹ B>
n Xt + X>
t ¹ CnXt; (A-5)
29where
¹ An = An¡1 ¡ An + A1 + tr(Cn¡1§§>) + ¹>Cn¡1¹ + B>
n¡1¹
¹ Bn = ©>Bn¡1 ¡ Bn + B1 + 2©>Cn¡1¹
¹ Cn = ©>Cn¡1© ¡ Cn + C1: (A-6)
B Estimating the Model
The model is estimated using a Bayesian Gibbs sampling algorithm. While there are several examples of these
types of estimations for afﬁne models (see, among others, Lamoureux and Witte, 2002; Johannes and Polson,
2005; Ang, Dong and Piazzesi, 2006; Dong, 2006), these cannot be directly employed to estimate the quadratic
model because in an afﬁne setting, drawing the latent factors requires a Kalman ﬁlter. The Kalman ﬁlter assumes
that yields are linear functions of state variables, whereas they are non-linear functions in the quadratic model. In
this appendix, we develop an acceptance-rejection algorithm to draw the latent factors without approximation.
For ease of notation, we group the macro variables as Mt = [gt ¼t]> and the latent factors as Lt = [at bt ft]>

































where "t = (">
M;t ">
L;t)> » IID N(0;I) and §11 and §22 are lower triangular.
The parameters of the model are £ = (¹; ©; §; ±0;±1; ­; ¹Q; ©Q; ¾u), where ¹Q and ©Q are parameters
governing the state variable process under the risk neutral probability measure, and ¾u denotes the vector of
observation error volatilities f¾ng. We draw ¹Q and ©Q, but invert the prices of risk ¸0 and ¸1 using the relations:
¸0 = §¡1(¹ ¡ ¹Q)
¸1 = §¡1(© ¡ ©Q): (B-2)
The latent factors Lt = fat bt ftg are generated in each iteration of the Gibbs sampler. Note that ­ and ±1 are not
estimated, given that they are ﬁxed from equation (9). We also do not draw ±0, but set this parameter to match the
sample mean of the short rate in each iteration.
We simulate 500,000 observations in addition to using a burn-in period of 50,000. We sample every ﬁfth
observation to lower the serial correlation of the parameter draws. To check the adequacy of the number of
simulations, we use the tests of Geweke (1992) and Raftery and Lewis (1992). For all parameters the simulation
length is more than adequate except for some companion form parameters where the stationarity constraint is
binding. These parameters are estimated to be always close to the unit circle no matter how many iterations are
used as they capture the high persistence of the factors.
We now detail the procedure for drawing each of these variables. We denote the factors X = fXtg and the
set of yields for all maturities in data as ~ Y = f~ yn
t g. Note that the model-implied yields Y = fyn
t g differ from the
yields in data, Y , by observation error. By deﬁnition, ~ Y = Y + u, where u = fun
t g is the set of all observation
errors for all yields. This notation also implies that the short rate in data, ~ rt, is the same as ~ y1
t.
B.1 Drawing the Latent Factors
We use a single-move algorithm based on Jacquier, Polson and Rossi (1994, 2004) adapted to our model. We
derive a draw from the distribution P(Ltj~ Y ;L¡t;M), where Lt is the t-th observation of the latent factors, L¡t
denotes all the latent factors except the t-th observation, and ~ Y and M are the complete time-series of yields and
macro variables, respectively. We use the notation ~ Yt and Mt to denote the t-th observation of the set of yields and
macro variables. We draw the latent factors Lt conditional on the macro factors, yields, and other parameters.
From the Markov structure of the model, we can write:
P(LtjL¡t; ~ Y ;M;£) / P(LtjLt¡1;M;£)P(~ YtjLt;M;£)P(Lt+1jLt;M;£): (B-3)
To keep the notation to a minimum, we write this as:
P(LtjL¡t) / P(LtjLt¡1)P(~ YtjLt)P(Lt+1jLt):
30Since M and £ are treated as known, we can write the dynamics for Lt in equation (B-1) as
Lt = ¹2 + §12"M;t + ©21Mt¡1 + ©22Lt¡1 + §22"L;t
= ¹L;t + ©LLt¡1 + §L"L;t; (B-4)
where ¹L;t = ¹2 + §12"M;t, ©L = ©22, and §L = §22. Since M is observable and we hold £ as ﬁxed, ¹L;t is
known at time t.
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: (B-5)
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where Xt = [L>
t M>
t ] and the summation is taken over yield maturities n. In the likelihood, the model-implied
yield, yn
t = an +b>
nXt +X>
t cnXt, is given in equation (15), and ¾2
n is the observation error variance of the yield
of maturity n.
We can combine equations (B-5)-(B-7) and complete the square to obtain:














































Since this distribution is not recognizable, we use a Metropolis draw. We draw a proposal from the distribution
N(¹¤
t;§¤
t) and then the acceptance probability is based on the likelihood of P(~ YtjLt).
In the three-factor constant Taylor rule model, yields are linear functions of the factors and there is no need for
the single-move algorithm. In this case, we employ the more efﬁcient Carter and Kohn (1994) forward-backward
algorithm to ﬁrst run a Kalman ﬁlter forward and then sample ft backwards. When the single-move algorithm
is employed, it produces parameter values and posterior sample paths of ft that are almost identical to those
produced by the forward-backward algorithm. Since we specify the mean of ft to be zero for identiﬁcation, we set
each generated draw of this factor to have a mean of zero.
In the benchmark four-factor speciﬁcation, we additionally require that at each point in time both at and bt are
non-negative for purposes of identiﬁcation.
In the extended ﬁve-factor model, we impose a prior for the draw of at and bt period by period. Speciﬁcally,













k;t represent the posterior mean and standard deviation of factor k in period t from the estimated benchmark
model. The motivation for imposing this prior is that we want the latent factor fext
t in the extended model to capture
only for short rate and term structure movements not accounted for by the four factors [gt ¼t at bt]> since the
model speciﬁes fext
t as a factor orthogonal to [gt ¼t at bt]> .
31B.2 Drawing ¹ and ©
We follow Johannes and Polson (2005) and explicitly differentiate between f¹;©g under the real measure and
f¹Q;©Qg under the risk-neutral measure. As Xt follows a VAR in equation (5), we follow standard Gibbs sam-
pling and use conjugate normal priors and posteriors for the draw of ¹ and ©. We note that the posterior of ¹ and
© conditional on X, ~ Y and the other parameters is:
P(¹;©j£¡;X; ~ Y ) / P(~ Y j£;X)P(Xj¹;©;§)P(¹;©) (B-9)
/ P(~ Y j§;±0;±1;¹Q;©Q;¾´;X)P(Xj¹;©;§)P(¹;©)
/ P(Xj¹;©;§)P(¹;©); (B-10)
where £¡ denotes the set of all parameters except ¹ and ©, and P(Xj¹;©;§) is the likelihood function of the
VAR, which is normally distributed from the assumption of normality for the errors in the VAR. The validity of
going from the ﬁrst line to the second line is ensured by the bond recursion in equation (A-3): given ¹Q and
©Q, the bond price is independent of ¹ and ©. We specify the prior P(¹;©) to be N(0;1000), which effectively
represents an uninformative prior. We draw ¹ and © separately for each equation in the VAR system (5). Given
that we impose the restriction that ft is mean zero for identiﬁcation, we set ¹f to zero.
B.3 Drawing §§>
To draw §§>, we note that the posterior of §§> conditional on X, ~ Y and the other parameters is:
P(§§>j£¡;X; ~ Y ) / P(Y j£;X)P(Xj¹;©;§)P(§§>); (B-11)
where £¡ denotes the set of all parameters except §. This posterior suggests an Independence Metropolis draw.
We draw §§> from the proposal density
q(§§>) = P(X j ¹;©;§)P(§§>);
which is an Inverse Wishart (IW) distribution if we specify the prior P(§§>) to be IW, so that q(§§>) is an
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P(~ Y j (§§>)m+1;£¡;X)




where P(~ Y j¹;©;£¡;X) is the likelihood function of all yields, including the short rate, which is normally dis-
tributed from the assumption of normality for the observation errors. From equation (B-12), ® is just the ratio of
the likelihoods of the new draw of §§> relative to the old draw.
B.4 Drawing ¹Q and ©Q
We draw ¹Q and ©Q with a Random Walk Metropolis algorithm assuming a ﬂat prior. We draw each parameter
separately in ¹Q, and each row in ©Q. The accept/reject probability for the draws of ¹Q and ©Q is the ratio of the
likelihood of bond yields based on candidate and last draw of ¹Q and ©Q:
® = min
(
P((¹Q;©Q)m+1 j £¡;X; ~ Y )







P(~ Y j (¹Q;©Q)m+1;£¡;X)




In each iteration, we invert ¸0 and ¸1 and report the estimates of the prices of risk instead of ¹Q and ©Q. We
discard non-stationary draws of ©Q.
32B.5 Drawing ¾u
Drawing the variance of the observation errors, ¾2
u, is straightforward, because we can view the observation errors
´ as regression residuals from equation (17). We draw the observation variance (¾n
´)2 separately from each yield.
We specify a conjugate prior IG(0;0:00001), so that the posterior distribution of ¾2
´ is a natural conjugate Inverse
Gamma distribution. The prior information roughly translates into a 30bp bid-ask spread in Treasury securities,
which is consistent with studies on the liquidity of spot Treasury market yields (see, for example, Fleming, 2000).
C Short Rate Variance Decomposition
For the short rate variance decomposition presented in Section 4.2.1, we write the short rate given by equation (8)
as
rt = ±0 + ±>
1 Xt + X>
t ­1Xt + X>
t ­2Xt; (C-1)




b¼ = 0:5 and zeros elsewhere. Then, the
unconditional variance of the short rate can be decomposed as:
var(rt) = var(atgt) + var(bt¼t) + 2cov(atgt; bt¼t)
= var(X>
t ­1Xt) + var(X>





















and §X is the unconditional covariance matrix of Xt implied by the VAR in equation (5).
D Impulse Responses
Since the yields are non-linear, we follow Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1993) and Potter (2000), among others,
and compute the impulse response functions using simulation. We start with the sample series of data (gt and ¼t)
and the posterior means of the latent factors (at and bt) at each observation t. We term these points X¤
t . From the
VAR in equation (5), we construct an orthogonalized error term ºt by taking the Cholesky of §§>. To construct
the impulse response for the jth variable of Xt, we ﬁrst draw a shock vt that represents a shock only to variable
j from the error term distribution ºt. From the points X¤
t , we construct a new series where each observation has
been shocked by vt, which we denote as Xv
t = X¤
t + vt.
The impulse response functions are taken as the difference between the averaged response of the yields to the
evolution of X¤




t ) ¡ E(yn
t+kjX¤
t ):
Using the VAR in equation (5), we simulate out the value of Xv
t+k from Xv
t and the value of X¤
t+k from X¤
t . This
is done at each observation t. Then, we construct the yields, yn
t+k, from equation (15) corresponding to the state
vectors Xv
t+k and X¤
t+k. We take values of k = 1:::60 quarters.
The impulse responses are computed at each observation by taking the average of the sample paths of yn
t+k
computed using Xv
t+k minus the average of the sample paths of yn
t+k computed using X¤
t+k. We report the average
of the impulse responses across all observations t. This procedure results in impulse responses that are identical to
impulse responses computed for traditional VAR systems for large numbers of observations.
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36Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Moments of Macro Factors
Means (%) Standard Deviations (%) Autocorrelations
Data Model Data Model Data Model
g 0.000 -0.094 2.349 2.372 0.930 0.927
(0.323) (0.528) (0.056) (0.116) (0.034) (0.021)
¼ 3.419 3.327 2.199 2.407 0.982 0.983
(0.321) (2.163) (0.262) (1.051) (0.026) (0.007)
Panel B: Moments of Yields
n = 1 n = 4 n = 8 n = 12 n = 16 n = 20
Means (%)
Data 5.083 5.429 5.616 5.775 5.895 5.973
(0.403) (0.400) (0.397) (0.388) (0.385) (0.380)
Model 5.083 5.437 5.660 5.766 5.862 6.005
– (0.051) (0.025) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Standard Deviations (%)
Data 2.820 2.784 2.749 2.683 2.656 2.615
(0.347) (0.308) (0.304) (0.297) (0.296) (0.284)
Model 2.796 2.782 2.754 2.701 2.644 2.597
(0.166) (0.060) (0.013) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008)
The table lists various moments of the factors in data and implied by the four-factor benchmark model.
All the factors and yields are expressed in annualized percentage terms. All standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Panel A lists moments of the output gap and inﬂation. for the benchmark model Panel B
reports data and benchmark model unconditional moments of n-quarter maturity yields. The benchmark
model has factors Xt = [gt ¼t at bt]> the short rate equation (2), factor dynamics in equation (5), prices
of risk in equation (11), and observation error standard deviations in equation (17) for yields of maturity n
quarters. For the model, we construct the posterior distribution of unconditional moments by computing the
unconditional moments implied from the parameters in each iteration of the Gibbs sampler. We compute the
posterior distribution of the model-implied yields using the generated latent factors in each iteration of the
Gibbs sampler. In Panels A and B, the data standard errors are computed using GMM with robust standard
errors. The sample period is June 1952 to December 2007 and the data frequency is quarterly.
37Table 2: Constant Taylor Rule Model
Short Rate Parameters





¹ £ 1000 g ¼ f g ¼ fstd
g 0.658 0.904 -0.082 -0.023 0.004 0.018 0
(0.267) (0.025) (0.027) (0.017) (0.000) (0.067) –
¼ -0.022 0.062 1.004 -0.015 0.018 0.001 0
(0.121) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.067) (0.000) –
fstd 0.016 0 0 0.940 0 0 0.008
(0.185) – – (0.026) – – (0.001)
Risk Premia Parameters
¸1
¸0 g ¼ fstd
g 0.243 9.497 7.661 -3.475
(0.797) (23.28) (18.96) (29.28)
¼ -3.056 100.89 18.76 -98.69
(2.482) (25.16) (17.66) (78.13)
fstd 0.133 0 0 -5.944
(0.197) – – (13.71)
Observation Error Standard Deviation
n = 1 n = 4 n = 8 n = 12 n = 16 n = 20
¾n
u 0.177 0.106 0.052 0.032 0.044 0.058
(0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
The table lists parameter values for the constant Taylor rule model for the factors Xt = [gt ¼t fstd
t ]> with
the short rate equation (1), factor dynamics in equation (5), prices of risk in equation (11), and observation
error standard deviations in equation (17) for yields of maturity n quarters. Any parameters without standard
errors are not estimated. We report the posterior mean and posterior standard deviation (in parentheses) of
each parameter. In the Volatility/Correlation matrix, we report standard deviations of each factor along the
diagonal multiplied by 1000 and correlations between the factors on the off-diagonal elements. The zero
entries in the ¸1 matrix result from the companion form © taking the form of equation (6) under both the risk
neutral and the real measure. The sample period is June 1952 to December 2007 and the data frequency is
quarterly.
38Table 3: Benchmark Model
Short Rate Parameters
¹ a ¹ b
±0 Sample VAR Sample VAR
0.003 0.356 0.372 1.117 1.154
(0.001) (0.063) (0.186) (0.115) (0.503)
VAR Parameters
© Volatility £1000/Correlation
¹ £ 1000 g ¼ a b g ¼ a b
g 0.563 0.911 -0.083 0.000 0 0.004 0.011 -0.038 -0.021
(0.690) (0.025) (0.036) (0.001) – (0.000) (0.067) (0.089) (0.106)
¼ 0.142 0.064 0.990 0 0.000 0.011 0.001 -0.332 -0.203
(0.164) (0.011) (0.007) – (0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (0.077) (0.075)
a 23.042 -1.114 0 0.937 0 -0.038 -0.332 4.072 0.854
(11.50) (0.763) – (0.027) – (0.089) (0.077) (0.994) (0.056)
b 66.593 0 2.682 0 0.922 -0.021 -0.203 0.854 47.832
(41.70) – (2.595) – (0.027) (0.106) (0.075) (0.056) (14.95)
Risk Premia Parameters
¸1
¸0 g ¼ a b
g 0.905 18.545 62.700 2.376 0
(0.360) (11.83) (17.63) (1.152) –
¼ -3.001 31.444 169.53 -0.027 -0.345
(0.486) (12.88) (12.32) (0.178) (0.218)
a -0.632 -6.314 62.881 -0.577 -0.118
(0.434) (15.28) (17.03) (0.595) (0.077)
b 0.082 23.948 -9.540 1.175 -0.663
(0.574) (23.08) (29.95) (0.832) (0.274)
Observation Error Standard Deviation
n = 1 n = 4 n = 8 n = 12 n = 16 n = 20
¾n
u 0.168 0.069 0.030 0.021 0.024 0.026
(0.043) (0.026) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
39Note to Table 3
The table lists parameter values for the benchmark model for the factors Xt = [gt ¼t at bt]> with the short
rate equation (2), factor dynamics in equation (5), prices of risk in equation (11), and observation error
standard deviations in equation (17) for yields of maturity n quarters. Any parameters without standard
errors are not estimated. We report the posterior mean and posterior standard deviation (in parentheses) of
each parameter. For the short rate parameters, we report two estimated long-run means ¹ a and ¹ b for at and bt,
respectively. The “sample” mean is the posterior mean of the latent factors averaged across the sample. For
the “population” mean we compute the population mean of the latent factors implied by the VAR parameters
in each iteration and report the posterior average. In the Volatility/Correlation matrix, we report standard
deviations of each factor along the diagonal multiplied by 1000 and correlations between the factors on the
off-diagonal elements. The zero entries in the ¸1 matrix result from the companion form © taking the form
of equation (6) under both the risk neutral and the real measure. The sample period is June 1952 to December
2007 and the data frequency is quarterly.
40Table 4: Extended Model
Short Rate Parameters
¹ a ¹ b
±0 Sample VAR Sample VAR
0.003 0.374 0.388 1.075 1.101
(0.000) (0.018) (0.184) (0.031) (0.516)
VAR Parameters
©
¹ £ 1000 g ¼ a b fext
g 0.355 0.907 -0.080 0.001 0 -0.058
(0.740) (0.025) (0.037) (0.001) – (0.048)
¼ 0.116 0.064 0.989 0 0.000 -0.014
(0.165) (0.011) (0.007) – (0.000) (0.015)
a 21.23 -1.267 0 0.945 0 0
(11.07) (0.693) – (0.027) – –
b 57.74 0 2.952 0 0.925 0
(36.87) – (2.334) – ( 0.026) –
fext 0 0 0 0 0 0.672
– – – – – (0.107)
Volatility £1000/Correlation
g 0.004 0.024 0.006 -0.009 0
(0.000) (0.068) (0.082) (0.078) –
¼ 0.024 0.001 -0.359 -0.185 0
(0.068) (0.000) (0.068) (0.086) –
a 0.006 -0.359 3.413 0.854 0
(0.082) (0.068) (0.708) (0.068) –
b -0.009 -0.185 0.854 35.818 0
(0.078) (0.086) (0.068) (6.437) –
fext 0 0 0 0 0.007




¸0 g ¼ a b fext
g 0.711 18.63 65.50 3.130 0 -28.27
(0.925) (11.97) (18.12) (0.707) – (22.72)
g -3.154 30.15 164.15 -0.076 -0.390 -15.49
(0.570) (11.94) (12.26) (0.220) (0.156) (15.94)
g -0.896 -8.92 63.33 -0.422 -0.152 -6.031
(0.391) (15.15) (14.84) (0.537) (0.071) (7.302)
g 0.360 27.04 -14.59 0.878 -0.712 3.899
(0.609) (24.48) (30.25) (0.997) (0.335) (6.053)
fext 0.063 0 0 0 0 79.33
(0.072) – – – – (52.67)
Observation Error Standard Deviation
n = 1 n = 4 n = 8 n = 12 n = 16 n = 20
¾n
u 0.081 0.038 0.024 0.018 0.022 0.024
(0.024) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
The table lists parameter values for the benchmark model for the factors Xt = [gt ¼t at bt fext
t ]> with the
short rate equation (4), factor dynamics in equation (5), prices of risk in equation (11), and observation error
standard deviations in equation (17) for yields of maturity n quarters. Any parameters without standard
errors are not estimated. We report the posterior mean and posterior standard deviation (in parentheses) of
each parameter. For the short rate parameters, we report two estimated long-run means ¹ a and ¹ b for at and bt,
respectively. The “sample” mean is the posterior mean of the latent factors averaged across the sample. For
the “population” mean we compute the population mean of the latent factors implied by the VAR parameters
in each iteration and report the posterior average. In the Volatility/Correlation matrix, we report standard
deviations of each factor along the diagonal multiplied by 1000 and correlations between the factors on the
off-diagonal elements. The zero entries in the ¸1 matrix result from the companion form © taking the form
of equation (6) under both the risk neutral and the real measure. The sample period is June 1952 to December
2007 and the data frequency is quarterly.
42Table 5: Yield Curve Variance Decompositions
n = 1 n = 4 n = 8 n = 12 n = 16 n = 20
g -0.083 -0.132 -0.152 -0.150 -0.140 -0.127
¼ 0.603 0.493 0.388 0.307 0.241 0.191
a 0.059 0.116 0.026 -0.089 -0.182 -0.249
b 0.170 0.254 0.275 0.247 0.213 0.191
g and a -0.083 -0.046 -0.137 -0.241 -0.320 -0.373
¼ and b 0.913 0.865 0.734 0.590 0.471 0.389
The table reports variance decompositions of yields implied by the benchmark model. The variance decom-







t ) is the variance of the n-quarter yield implied by the model through the sample computed by
setting the time-varying factor µ equal to its posterior mean and var(yn
t ) is the full model-implied variance of
the n-quarter yield through the sample.
43Figure 1: Output Gap, Inﬂation, and the Short Rate





















We plot the output gap, inﬂation, and the short rate. The output gap is deﬁned as the proportional difference
between actual and potential real GDP. Inﬂation is the year-on-year GDP deﬂator. The short rate is the three-
month T-bill yield. We overlay the NBER recession periods in shaded bars. The sample period is from June
1952 to December 2007 and the data frequency is quarterly. All data is in annualized percentage terms.
44Figure 2: Components of the Short Rate
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The top panel plots the short rate together with the ﬁtted components from the benchmark model, ±0+atgt+
bt¼t, where the policy factors at and bt are evaluated at their posterior means at each observation from the
Gibbs sampler. All variables are in annualized units. The bottom panel plots each short rate component
separately. The sample period is from June 1952 to December 2007 and the data frequency is quarterly.
45Figure 3: Time-Varying Policy Coefﬁcients


















We plot the posterior mean of the time-varying loadings at and bt in the thick lines together with two posterior
standard deviation bands in thin lines from the benchmark model. We overlay the NBER recession periods
in shaded bars. The sample period is from June 1952 to December 2007 and the data frequency is quarterly.
46Figure 4: Yield Curve Impulse Responses to Factor Shocks
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We plot the impulse responses of the short rate, rt, the 20-quarter yield, y20
t , and the yield spread, y20
t ¡ rt,
to an unconditional one-standard deviation shock in the output gap and inﬂation (gt and ¼t respectively) in
the ﬁrst two columns and an unconditional one-standard deviation shock to at and bt in the last two columns.
We compute impulse responses following the method in Appendix D. Units on the x-axis are in quarters and
the responses of yields on the y-axis are annualized and in percentages.
47Figure 5: Term Structure Responses to Factor Shocks
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We plot the impulse responses of an unconditional one-standard deviation shock in the output gap (left col-
umn) and inﬂation (right column) on the term structure of yields, yn
t . We compute impulse responses follow-
ing the method in Appendix D. Yield maturities in quarters, n, are on the x-axis and the responses of yields
on the y-axis are annualized and in percentages. The initial shock occurs at t = 0 and the expected yield
curve is plotted at various t in quarters after the initial shock in rows. The x-axis is marked as a horizontal
dotted line.
48Figure 6: Risk Premia Responses to Factor Shocks









































We plot the impulse responses of an unconditional one-standard deviation shock to the output gap, inﬂation,
the inﬂation loading, and the output gap loading (clockwise from the top-left panel) to the expected excess
holding period return, Et[xhprn
t+1], of the n = 4-quarter bond in the solid line and the n = 20-quarter bond
in the dashed line. The conditional risk premia are evaluated at the model’s implied unconditional mean.
Units on the x-axis are in quarters and the responses of risk premia on the y-axis are annualized and in
percentages.






































The ﬁgure plots the price of a unit shock to at (ﬁrst row) and a unit shock to bt (second row) as a function
of the output gap loading at or inﬂation loading bt. We denote with vertical lines the steady-state value of
¹ a = 0:372 and¹ b = 1:154. When altering at and bt, we set all other factors equal to their expected conditional
values given the value of at or bt. We plot plus and minus two unconditional standard deviations of at and bt
on the x-axis.
50Figure 8: The Post-2001 Episode
















t at 2000 average
The ﬁgure plots the short rate (top panel) and the 5-year term spread (bottom panel), which is the 5-year yield
minus the 3-month T-bill, from the results of a counter-factual experiment. We hold the Fed weight on the
output gap and inﬂation constant at its average level over 2000 and allow all other factors to take their sample
values. The ﬁgure plots the effect on the yield curve post-2001 in the dashed lines along with the actual paths
of the yield curve in the solid lines. Units on the y-axis are annualized and in percentages.
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